The Impact of the Runaway Office on Union Certification Elections in Clerical Units by Beatrice J. Freiberg & William T. Dickens
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES





Working Paper No. 1693




The authors thank Dean Francis and John Montoya of the Oakland,
California Regional Office of the NLRB for making available the
data used in this study. The authors also greatfully acknowledge
the help of Mary Ann Massenburg, Barbara Baran, Kay Eisenhower,
John Bowers, Phil Shapira, Lucas Guttentag, Suzy Teegarden, Rome
Aloise, Marcella Farinha, Jack McLaughlin, and many other union
organizers and researchers who gave generously of their time.
Finally, the authors also thank Philip Bokovoy for research
assistance and the University of California Presidential Fellowship
Committee and the Institute of Industrial Relations for generous
research support. The research reported here is part of the NBER's
research program in Labor Studies. Any opinions expressed are
those of the authors and not those of the National Bureau of
Economic Research.NBER Working Paper #1693
August 1985




The law prohibits firms from moving work to avoid unionization. Still,
many employees fear that joining a union may cost them their jobs. This
paper assesses the impact of that fear on how clerical workers vote in
union certification elections. Two data sets were collected and analyzed
for this purpose, and three measures of the firms' ability to relocate
office work were developed.
Clerical workers in offices that were judged to be easier to relocate
were found to be more likely to report that the fear of job loss was
important to their voting decision. Those who voted against the union were
most likely to report that the fear that they would lose their jobs was a
significant consideration. Further, workers in units judged to be most
easily relocated were found to have a 7 to 30% lower probability of voting
union than those who were in less mobile jobs.
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(212) 566—3770 —5452"I've worked for Mutual Insurance for the past ten years doing
clerical work."
"Are the clerical workers unionized at Mutual Insurance?"
"Oh, no. We don't want a union."
"Whynot?"
"Job security. When the union won at Blue Shield, the employer moved
their jobs. The union couldn't hold on to their jobs. We don't want a
union. We prefer to have our jobs."
Conversation with a San Francisco clerical worker, June 1983
In 1972 Office and Professional Employees Union (OPEU) organized 1700
keypunch and data processing employees at Blue Shield Insurance Company,
San Francisco. Eleven years later, only one hundred jobs were left. In
1974 the employer transferred 500—600 jobs to a nonunion office in San
Diego. Later, the union lost an organizing drive there. In 1981, the
largely minority—female work force struck Blue Shield. During the
five—month strike that ensued, Blue Shield relocated about 450 jobs to six
nonunion offices. The work, which was done on computer terminals, could be
easily transferred electronically to the other offices. Finally, more than
400 jobs were moved to three remote small—town offices in 1983. "Now,
wherever there's an organizing drive, employers use what happened at Blue
Shield as a warning to their workers," said a former Blue Shield employee.
"They tell them, 'Oh sure, you want to vote for the union. Well, let me
tell you what the union did for the employees in San Francisco——lost their
jobs.
11,1
Labor law places few restrictions on a unionized employer's right to
relocate work. Prior to the 1984 National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)2
decision,2 the only reasons for which an employer could not relocate union
jobs were 1) the cost of labor, 2) to avoid a union organizing attempt, or
3) to rid a company of a union. Under the new ruling, labor costs may
justify moving an operation. If the union succeeds in raising workers'
wages, the company has a legal excuse for relocating thework.
Companies with organized office workers have taken advantage of the
allowances the law makes and have left the union behind. Blue Shield in
San Francisco moved 1600 organized clerical jobs to nine nonunion offices;
Consumer's Distributing Company relocated its Western Regional office with
50 organized clerical workers along with its other operations to Reno,
Nevada; Pacific InterMountain Express, a trucking company in Oakland,
California, moved its entire operations, including 100 organized clerical
jobs, to Florida; and O.N.C. Trucking Company, owned by Rocor
International, expanded and moved 130 union clerical jobs to Kansas City,
Missouri. In the course of our research, we encountered 22 cases of
runaway union offices in the San Francisco Bay Area between1973 and 1983.
This list is by no means exhaustive.
In the past, office work was as moveable as the company of which it
was a part.But with advances in microprocessor technology and
telecommunications, office work is easy and inexpensive to move. Employers
can now relocate office work electronically. A 1983 Wall StreetJournal
headline read, "Now we can move office work offshore to enhanceoutput."3
According to the article, satellite technology and falling pricesin
hardware, transmission costs, and earth stations make it cost effectivefor
large corporations, particularly in banking, insurance and publishing,to
move data entry and word processing jobs to remote locations.3
One consequence of the ease with which office jobs can be moved may be
a heightened sense of job insecurity among office workers. Job security ——
oncea compelling reason to vote for the union ——mayironically have
become a potent management threat, helping to prevent unionization.
If the fear of relocation is a significant concern, then clerical
workers with mobile jobs should vote against unionization more often than
clerical workers with jobs that cannot be moved, all other things held
equal. This paper considers the hypothesis that the ease with which jobs
may be moved (job mobility) has a significantly negative impact on the
percent of workers voting union in certification elections. To do so, the
voting behavior of clerical workers in 101 union certification elections
(UCEs) was analyzed. We find that workers in the most mobile offices are 7
to 30 percent less likely to vote union than those in the least mobile
jobs, depending on the measure of mobility used and the specification used
to estimate the effect. These results may help explain why union
organizers believe that clerical organizing has been most successful in
not—for—profit organizations and the public sector, and less successful in
finance, insurance and real estate companies.4 To the extent that jobs in
not—for—profit organizations and the public sector are largely immobile,
they will be earier to organize.
The next section discusses the data collected to analyze the impact of
the fear of relocation on voting in UCEs. The section following discusses
the measures of job mobility developed for this study. We then consider
whether workers in firms rated to be mobile by our criteria perceive their
jobs to be mobile and whether that was an important consideration in their
decision to vote union. Finally, we present the analysis of the voting4
data. The conclusion reviews the findings and considers their relevance
for explaining recent trends in UCE success rates and for labor law.
Data
In order to determine the impact of office mobility, results from 101
TJCEs involving only office workers were gathered. The elections were held
in the Oakland and San Francisco regional NLRB districts between 1971 and
1983. Eighty—nine of these UCEs were randomly selected from the "closed
case't files of the Oakland regional office of the NLRB, and twelve from the
same files at the San Francisco NLRB regional office. The selection
process involved searching 12,000 index cards of closed cases and singling
out only those cases where an election in a clerical unit had been held.
From all the index cards a random sample of 101 clerical elections was
chosen. Clerical units were defined to be those including one or more of
the following jobs:office—clericals, data processors, switchboard
operators, secretaries, PBX operators, plant clericals, warehouse
clericals, receptionists, reservationists, cashiers, desk clerks, customer
service representatives, key entry operators, dispatchers, and telephone
operators.
There were 4,652 clerical workers involved in the 101 union elections.
The union won 61% of the elections, and the company won the remaining 39%.
Fifty—seven percent of all workers voted for the union. Although the
percentage of union victories in the sample is substantially greater than
the national or the California average for union wins in any year for which
data are available,5 there is no reason to expect that the percentage of
union wins in clerical units should be the same as for other types of
units. For example, win rates differ greatly by industry. Also, because5
of the difficulty in organizing clerical units, unions may only take on
those cases which ara more likely to win.
In order to analyze the effect of mobility as a determinant of
election results, information on other variables known to influence
outcomes of union elections was obtained so that their effects could be
controlled for. Some of the background information on each election was
gathered from the NLRB election files: the election date, the company name
and location, the industry, the union name and local number, and the size
and job description of the office unit. To obtain the rest of the data,
the union organizer or local president involved in each election was
interviewed and asked: the number of other employees at each location,
whether these employees were organized, the number of other organized and
unorganized company locations, the degree of management resistance during
the organizing campaign,6 how easy it would be for the company to relocate,
a detailed description of the office work, and the gender and ethnicity of
the unit.
Measuring Mobility
Measuring the mobility of clerical jobs poses a difficult problem.
Little research has been done on what types of firms are most likely to
relocate. Therefore, in order to distinguish between the mobile jobs and
immobile jobs in our sample, methods to measure the mobility of office work
had to be developed. Three different methods were used.Each has
advantages and drawbacks. The evidence from the three measures is
complimentary and, together, much stronger than using any one by itself.
The first method used to determine the mobility of election units was
to survey the organizers involved in each election. Each described the6
type of work the clericals performed and rated the work as mobile, somewhat
mobile, or immobile. Since the organizers have detailed information about
the company and its ability to relocate jobs, and since they knew which
offices they had previously organized had moved and which had not, they
should be qualified to make an informed assessment.
The major disadvantage of this method is that the organizers are not
unbiased judges. Organizers know the outcome of the elections and whether
the work was relocated. They might be expected to exaggerate the mobility
in elections they lost to justify the outcome, thus causing a spurious
correlation between mobility and election losses. Also, a few of the
organizers were unfamiliar with office work and may not be expert judges of
mobility.
The second method used for defining the clerical units as mobile or
not involved employing an expert on firm's locational choices. Our expert
was Barbara Baran, a doctoral candidate in the University of California,
Berkeley's Department of City and Regional Planning, who is writing a
thesis on how firms decide where to locate office jobs. The organizers
mentioned above were also asked to list the criteria they thought
important in determining mobility. Ms. Baran was given information on the
following 22 characteristics, which were the ones most frequently
mentioned.
1)Do the office workers do general office work? (a variety of clerical
tasks which need to be done on site, excluding computer work)
2) Do the office workers do work for more than one office?
3)Do the office workers work with computers?
4)Are the office workers plant clericals?(Clericals who track
inventory and whose jobs could be moved only if the plant were moved.)7
5)Do the office workers work in a health care facility?
6)Do the office workers work for a utility?
7)Do the office workers do mainly phone work?
8)Do the office workers work on a switchboard?
9)Do the office workers work with customers on site?
10) Number of clericals in the election unit.
11) Number of workers at site.
12) Year of the election.
13) Are there other workers organized at site?
14) Are other workers at site also voting in an election?
15) Are other company offices organized?
16) Are all other company offices organized?
17) Number of other company offices.
18) Is this a family—owned business?
19) Industry.
20) Population of city or town.
21) Union involved in the election.
22) Unique features of unit relevant to mobility of jobs. For example,
brief, detailed job descriptions.
She rated the clerical units as mobile, somewhat mobile, or immobile,
based on the above information. Besides the obvious advantage of using an
expert on office mobility to decide each firm's potential torelocate, the
other advantage of this method is that Ms. Baran did not know the results
of the union elections or whether any firms moved. However, this measure
has a drawback in that it was based on less information than the
organizers'.8
For our third measure we constructed an index of mobility. The index
incorporated 15 of the 22 mobility determinants used by the expert judge's
analysis. Based on discussions with organizers, and other experts familiar
with office work and runaway jobs, the factors were assigned weights
according to their relative importance in determining the mobility of
office work. Positive points were awarded to those characteristics that
were associated with immobility and negative points were given for those
that are associated with mobility.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
We began by assuming that a firm with none of these characteristics would
be mobile (—5 points). Points were added and subtracted from these. After
the adding and subtracting was done, firms with negative point totals were
rated as mobile.
The advantages of the index of mobility are that it is systematic and
somewhat objective.7 Major disadvantages of this measure are that the
system uses only a limited amount of information and has no flexibility to
deal with unique cases.
Validating the Mobility Measures
Do office workers know and care about mobility? If the theory is
correct that the fear of relocation makes office workers less likely to
vote for unionization, then office workers must be aware of the mobility of
their work. In order to document this awareness, a questionnaire was
developed to test whether relocation is more of a concern among office
workers with mobile jobs than among workers with immobile jobs.9
The questionnaire was given to clerical workers at five locations
where TJCEs had recently been held. The five elections were the only recent
ones in the Bay Area where we were able to gain access to the workers. (A
copy of the questionnaire is provided in Appendix 1..)The questionnaire
asked the office workers to rate the importance of ten factors in their
decisions to vote for or against the union. They could rate the factors as
very important (1 point), somewhat important (2 points), not too important
(3 points) and not at all important (4 points). The only response on the
questionnaire of interest was the rating given to the item ttthe concern
that your employer may have your job done at a different location, if the
union won."
The first group of office workers who answered the questionnaire
worked for a major airline as phone reservationists. Applying the mobility
criteria from table 1, these jobs are considered mobile. Beginning with —5
points and adjusting for the applicable categories:
(6) there were other organized workers (2 points);
(11) the ratio of clerical work to nonclerical work was66% (—4 points);
(12) the office workers worked entirely with computers (—4 points); and
(15) the sole function of the office was phone work (—2 points);
we arrive at a score of —13 points. The union certification election at
this airline company lost. The average response on the question about the
importance of fear of job loss was 3.50, halfway between not too important
and not at all important.
The next group of workers who filled out the questionnaire worked for
a trucking company and their jobs were also determined to be mobile by the
criteria: (1) General office work (5 points); (6) other organized workers
(2 points); (11) ratio of clerical work to nonclerical is greater than or10
equal to 66% (—4 points); and (13) some of the office work is done on
computers (—2 points) ——or—4 points overall. The UCE lost here, too.
The average response of the clericals at the moving company was 2.5,
halfway between not too important and somewhat important.
The third group of workers, employed by a retail food store, were
called immobile by the criteria. They were (—5 to begin) (2) plant
clericals (10 points), (9) the percentage of clericals was less than 10% (4
points), and (6) there were other organized workers (2 points) ——for11
points. The UCE held here won.
According to the criteria, the plant clericals were the most immobile
group of workers. Their average response to letter D was3.86 out of a
possible four points. More than four—fifths of those responding said that
the possibility of job loss was not at all important in their decision.
The fourth group who filled out the questionnaire were the office
clericals for the same retail food store. The union was certified here,
too. The criteria determined the work to be immobile because (begin with
—5) (1) they did general office work (5 points); (6) other organized
workers (2 points); (9) percentage of clericals to nonclericals was less
than 10% (4 points); and (12) all the clericals worked with computers (—4
points); this total is two points.
The average response of the office—clericals (the least immobile of
the immobile groups) was 3.62. More than three—fifths of those responding
said that the possibility of job loss was not at all important in their
decision.
The criteria also defined the last group as immobile. They worked for
a Cable T.V. company and voted for representation. They did (beginwith
—5) (1) general office work (5 points); (6) worked with organized workers11
(2 points); (9) the percentage of clericals to nonclericals was less than
10% (4 points); and (13) some of the clericals worked with computers (—2
points). This gave the unit a total of four points. The workers here
voted to certify the union. The average response that these clericals gave
to the importance of job relocation was 3.75. Over three fourths of the
clericals reported that job loss was not an important consideration in
their decision.
The ratings that the five groups of workers gave to the importance of
the fear of job relocation were consistent with the mobility criteria; the
clericals with the mobile jobs rated the threat as more important. The
average rating for the mobile workers was 3.32 and the average rating for
immobile workers was 3.71 (with one meaning very important and four least
important). The difference of these means is statistically significant at
the .05 level using a one—tail T test.
These results indicate that workers in mobile jobs do perceive and
care about the possibility of job mobility. Although on average workers
rated this factor somewhere between not too important and not at all
important, company voters in the two mobile units viewed the issue as being
"not too important" to "somewhat important" on average.8 Some saw it as
"very important." Further, workers in the two mobile firms viewed the
issue as more important, on average, than those in the units judged to be
immobile.
Finally, the fact that in each election judged to be immobile the
union won, and in every case union voters saw mobility as a less important
issue than those who voted against certification, suggests the importance
of job mobility in determining the outcome of certification elections. The
next section considers this question in more detail.12
Analysis of the Voting Data
Table 2 presents the one—way analysis of variances for the percent of
office workers voting for the union, broken down into mobile and immobile
groups using each of the three mobility measures.In all cases, the
mobility effect is in the anticipated direction ——loweringthe probability
of voting union. The magnitudes are roughly the same for the three
measures and workers in the most mobile units are statistically
significantly less likely to vote for the union. The F tests reject the
hypothesis at the .05 level for both the organizers and the mobility index
ratings. The expert judge's rating rejects the hypothesis at the 0.15
level.
While these results support the hypothesis that more mobile clerical
units are more likely to vote against unionization, they are not
conclusive. The one—way analysis of variance provides no controls for
other factors which may be influencing election outcomes. Many factors
which determine mobility may have a direct effect on the election outcomes
as well. To account for these effects we used a statistical procedure with
multiple control variables. The procedure allows for the fact that the
percent voting union in an election is a limited dependent variable.It
also allows for possible heteroskedasticity in the error term in the
equation predicting the proportion voting union, which is caused by the
variation in the number of people taking part in each election. The
2
procedure is a modified version of Haldane s minimum xlogit proposed by
Dickens9 (see Appendix 2 for a description).
Initially, all the control variables listed in table 3 were entered
into the analysis and those with t<1were removed (except for the
mobility variables). Overall, the coefficient values for mobilityeither13
did not change or became smaller as variables were removed. However, the
standard errors became smaller as the degrees of freedom increased.
Table 4 shows the results for the minimum x2 logit analysis. The
first column presents the coefficients of the mobility dummy variables.
The second column presents the approximate impact of mobility on the
proportion of workers voting for certification, and the third column
presents the results of the F tests for joint significance of each set of
mobility measures.
The first set of results does not include controls for management
resistance. In this case the signs and relative sizes of the coefficients
are all as would be expected except for the units organizers rated as
somewhat mobile. There the coefficient is slightly positive but is far
from statistically significant. For both the expert judge's ratings and
the mobility index, the mobile units are statistically significantly less
likely to vote union and the impact on the probability of voting union is
nearly the same as for the one—way analysis of variance.
Previous work on the determinants of voting in union certification
elections suggests the importance of management resistance.1° It is
possible that mobility is not responsible for reducing the probability of
workers voting union. Rather, management resistance might be stronger in
the mobile firms. The problem with controlling for management resistance
is that it is endogenous; in the companies where, for reasons we do not
observe, the organizing drive is weak, management's anti—union campaign
does not need to be as intense to win. Strong union organizing drives may
give rise to intense management efforts or no effort at all. Therefore,
the results including management resistance variables should be interpreted
with caution.14
With management resistance included, the coefficients all have the
anticipated signs and relative magnitudes. In addition, their sizes do not
change much.However, only the mobility index measure is still
statistically significant. This may mean that the management resistance
and mobility effects are substitutes for each other; when one effect is
present, the other does not matter. Therefore the impact of mobility on
elections should be examined where management resistance was negligible.
The third section of table 4 presents these results.Here, the
coefficients all have the anticipated signs; three out of five are
statistically significant. The only peculiar result is that the effect of
"somewhat mobile" is greater than "mobile" in the expert judge's result.
However, the hypothesis that the effect of "mobile" is greater than
"somewhat mobile" cannot be rejected. In all three cases the impact of
mobility is large and, for the most mobile units, statistically
significant.
The pattern of results is strongly consistent with the hypothesis that
the mobility of office work influences voting in union certification
elections. The effect was to reduce the percent voting for certification
by 7.5—30%, with most estimates around 15%. In this sample of clerical
elections, as in most UCEs, the elections are close so that a 1% decrease
in the probability of voting union translates into roughly a 2% drop in the
probability of a union victory. Thus, mobile office units appear to be
15—60% less likely to certify a union.15
Conclusion
We have examined the role of job mobility in influencing the outcome
of union certification elections. To determine whether workers in more
mobile jobs perceived mobility to be an important problem, we constructed
and distributed a questionnaire to workers who took part in recent
certification elections. Workers in the two units judged to be mobile, on
average, felt that the fear of job loss was a more significant factor in
their voting decision than the workers in the three immobile units. Also,
those who voted against certification were more likely to report that
mobility was a significant factor in their decision.
To determine the impact of mobility on voting, data was collected on
101 clerical unit certification elections which took place in Central and
Northern California between 1971 and 1983. Three measures of office
mobility were developed. The analysis of this data suggests that clerical
workers in potentially mobile jobs are considerably less likely to vote
union than those in immobile jobs.
These results can help explain why union organizers believe clerical
organizing has been much more successful in the public sector and in
not—for—profit firms than in large private—sector firms. To the extent
that clerical units in private—sector firms are easier to move, they will
be harder to organize.Additionally, if other types of workers are
similarly fearful that unionization will result in job loss and if the
claims by some authors that job relocation has been taking place more often
in recent years are true,11 these results may also help explain the
long—run decline in union success in organizing new workers. A recent Wall
Street Journal article describes how Ingersoll—Rand has reduced the percent
of its work force that is union by 30%. In part this has been done by16
shutting down union plants.12 The article also describes the effect of
this on how workers vote in union representation elections at
Ingersoll—Rand. At least according to union leaders interviewed by the
article's author, the fear of plant shutdowns was a major reason why
workers voted against unions in several elections.If this pattern of
aggressive union resistance is typical ——asthe article suggests ——our
results may also help explain the decline of union density in
manufacturing.
Finally, to the extent that it is the goal of U.S. labor law to
protect workers from employer coercion in choosing whether or not to be
represented by a union, the law is failing ——atleast for clerical
workers. Our evidence strongly suggests that many workers are voting
against unions not because they would prefer no representation but because
they fear that if they choose representation they will lose their jobs.17
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a variety of clerical tasks which need to be done on site
in order for the location to function (no computer work) 5
2..Inventory work; plant clericals (no computer work) 10
3.Utilityciericais 10
4.Local or family ownership of a single operation. 10
5.No other offices 4
6.Other workers at plant or office are organized 2
7.No other unorganized locations 3
8.Less than 3 other unorganized locations 2
9.Ratio of clerical workers to nonclerical workers at plant or
office is .1 4
10. Office workers work with customers at the location. 10
11. Ratio of clerical workers to nonclerical workers at plant or
office is .66 4
12. Office workers work entirely with computers —4
13. Some of the office work is done on computers —2
14. The office workers do work for at least two of the company's
locations 4
15. The sole function of the office is phone work —2
Units with point totals0 are assumed to be immobile. Those with
negative point totals were assumed to be mobile.20
Table 2
One—Way Analysis of Variance of Percent of Workers Voting Union
Mobility Measure % Voting Difference Standard Error forF—Test of Joint
Union Between Mobile Difference Between Significance




Not Mobile 65.4% significant
1A1..41 fl 1W 107 /07 ¶JWWLLd. I.. LLL1 I.) J J • I I. — ./ • 1 1. V • 9/0 at.
Mobile 49.5% _15.9%** 6.4% .05 level
Expert 's
Judgment:
Not Mobile 62.6% significant
Somewhat Mobile 54.1% —8.5% 8.2% at
Mobile 45.9% _16.7%* 9.3% .15 level
Mobility Index:
Not Mobile 63.3% significant
Mobile 51.2% _12.2%* 5.9% at .05 level
significant at .05 level *
.01level **
inone—tail testComposition of Unit:
Table 3











1 for no data on race
Year election was held
Number of workers employed
Number of workers in unit



















































(left out category is FIRE)
business has no other locations.
business has more than 10 other locations.
some other workers at site are organized.
is computer work.
do work for other offices.
do general office work.
do inventory work.
deal with customers in person.
do only computer work.
do phone work.
operate a switch board.
firm isfamily owned.22
Table 4
Minimum x2 Logit Transformation of Fraction Voting Union
Regressed on Nobility Measures and Controls






Somewhat Mobile .029 (.254) .007 Fail to reject
Mobile —.324 (.276) —.078
Expert' s Judgment:
2
Somewhat Mobile —.324 (.375) —.078 Fail to reject
Mobile _.712*(.331) —.171
Mobility Index:3





Somewhat Mobile —.043 (.230) —.010 Fail to reject
Mobile —.306 (.259) —.073
5
Expert s Judgment
Somewhat Mobile —.224 (.352) —.054 Fail to reject
Mobile —.509 (.572) —.122
Nobility Index6:






Somewhat Mobile —.096 (.329) —.023 Fail to reject
Mobile _.675* (.380) —.162
Expert' s Judgment5:
Somewhat Mobile _1.30** (.480) —.312 Significant at
Mobile —.72(.677) —.174 .05 level
Mobility Index6:








tThis is an approximation to the expected change in the proportion of
workers voting union in an average unit. It is constructed by multiplying
the coefficient times the average proportion voting union times one minus
that proportion.
1.Control variables in equation after removal of those units with t
statistics <Iare: percent Chicano, more than 10 locations,
teamsters, communications, some computer work, clericals do work for
other offices, clericals do inventory work, utility, clericals do
phone work, clericals operate switchboard.
2.Control variables in equation after removal of those witht
statistics <1are: more than 10 locations, CWA, communications
industry, clericals do some computer work, clericals do work for more
than one office, clericals do inventory work, utility, clericals do
phone work, clericals operate switchboard.
3.Control variables in equation after removal of those with t
statistics <1are: percent Chicano, more than 10 locations,
teamsters, communications industry, clericals do some computer work,
clericals do work for other offices, clericals do inventory work,
utility, clericals do phone work, clericals operate switchboard.
4.Control variables in equation after removing those units with t
statistics <1are: percent Chicano, more than 10 other locations,
ILWIJ, communications industry, clericals do some computer work,
clericals do inventory work, utility, clericals do phone work,
clericals operate switchboard, and two dummy variables for elections
with normal and intense management resistance.
5.Control variables in equation after removing those with t statistics
<1are: percent Chicano, year, more than 10 locations, teamsters,
CWA, trucking industry, communications industry, utility, clericals do
some computer work, clericals do some work for other offices,
clericals do inventory work, clericals do phone work, clericals
operate switchboard, and two dummy variables for elections with normal
and intense management resistance.
6.Control variables in equation after removing those with t
statistics <1are: percent Chicano, more than 10 other locations,
teamsters, utility, clericals do some computer work, clericals do work
for other offices, clericals do inventory work, clericals do phone
work, clericals operate switchboard, and two dummy variables for
elections with normal and intense management resistance.
7. Specifications are the same as those above except that the management
resistance dummies were interacted with the mobility measure. Only
the coefficients for mobility when resistance was light are reported.Appendix 1
Questionnaire Used to Validate Mobility Measures
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At your workplace an election for union representation was held. As
office workers you were able to vote in the election. Regardless of
how you voted, please evaluate how the following factors influenced
your decision to vote for or against the union (or not to vote at
all). YOUR ANSWERS ARE COMPLETELY CONFIDENTIAL.
For each question, please circle the number that best describes how
important each factor was in your decision to vote for or against union
representation.




Not too Not at all
B. The information provided by
union supporters about the union.
C. The union dues you would have to
pay if the union won
THANK YOU
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
D.The concern that your employer
may have your job done at a
different location if the
unionwon 1 2 3 4
E.Your present relationship
with management 1 2 3 4
F.Your opportunities for job
training or promotion at
your present job 1 2 3 4
G.The possibility of a strike
if the union won 1 2 3 4
H.The information provided by
your employer about the union .. 1 2 3 4
I.The computerization of office
work/word processing 1 2 3 4
J.The amount of influence you had
on decisions affecting your work. 1 2 3 4
For Against DidNotVote
K.How did you vote in the union
representation election? 1 2 3




One standard approach to estimating models where the dependent variable
is a proportion is to assume that the expected value for the proportion for





Designatingthe size of each group i as N. and the actual proportion as
if we assume that Np is a binomially distributed random variable with
expected value p.N. then the 8 s of (1) can be consistently estimated by
regressing log {;iI(l_;i)] on the X s and can be efficiently estimated
if the variables are all weighted by an appropriate approximation to the
variance of the random variable
v. =log —log
{pJ(1_p.)]
This is the method of Minimum Chi—Squared Logit.26
There are two problems with this as an approach to the data used here.
First some of the p. s are equal to one or zero so that the standard logit
transformation is undefined.This problem is remedied by adopting the






2N. 2N. i 1 1
The second problem is that both logit transformations assume that all attri-
butes of an election unit which determine the probability of a worker voting
union are observed. This is certainly not the case. To solve this problem we
augment the Haldane model by assuming
L. =X+ Y.
1 i 1
where 1.is an unobserved i.i.d. error term. Dickens [19851 shows that
this model can be efficiently estimated using a 2—step procedure.In the
first step consistent estimates of the s and the variance of the are
obtained. Weighted estimation is done in the second step to obtain efficient
estimates.